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INTRODUCTION
The Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT") are now in the middle of the Uruguay Round of
multilateral trade negotiations. A number of the Contracting Parties,
including the European Community, Japan, Korea, Hong Kong and
the United States, have tabled proposals for change in the anti-dump-
ing regime which may influence the formulation of national anti-
dumping laws for the decade to come. The negotiations have not,
however, prevented important Code signatories from acting unilater-
ally against what they perceive to be shortcomings in the present sys-
tem: the EEC and the U.S. have both recently implemented
amendments to their anti-dumping laws which arguably address newly
arisen issues by broadening the potential application of their domestic
anti-dumping laws. '
In some cases, an important justification for such amendments is
that other jurisdictions have adopted similar or even more far reaching
interpretations of the elements of the anti-dumping law. Such claims
are often made out of context, and are sometimes misleading. This
article argues that the best way of stopping such a "race to the bot-
tom" through unilateral interpretation of anti-dumping principles is
detailed multilateral regulation through the GATT.
1. Australia has also enacted substantial amendments to its anti-dumping law. For more
detail about these amendments, see Steele, The Australian Anti-dumping System, in ANTI-DUMP-
ING LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY ch. 6, postscript (J. Jackson & E. Vermulst
ed., University of Michigan Press forthcoming 1989).
The EEC 'parts' or 'screwdriver' amendment has been challenged in GATT by Japan. The
EEC has agreed to have the amendment investigated by a GATT dispute settlement panel. See
FIN. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1988, at 9, col. 2. For overviews of the EEC 'parts' amendment, see Van
Bael, Japanese Investment in the EEC- Trojan Horse or Hostage?, INT'L FIN. L. REV., June 1988,
at 10; Bierwagen & Hailbronner, Input, Downstream, Upstream, Secondary, Diversionary and
Components or Subassembly Dumping, J. WORLD TRADE L., June 1988, at 27; Hailbronner,
Bierwagen, 'Neue' Formen des Dumping und ihre Regelung im Aussenwirtschaftsrecht der
Europaischen Gemeinschaften, 9 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 705 (1988);
Landsittel, Anti-dumpingzolle auf in der Gemeinschaft hergestellte Waren, 1988 WETTBEWERB
IN RECHT UND PRAXIs 21; Steenbergen, Circumvention of Anti-dumping Duties by Importation
of Parts and Materials.: Recent EEC Anti-dumping rules, II FORDHAM INT'L L. J., 382 (1988).
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This article, part of an in-depth comparative study of municipal
anti-dumping laws in Australia, Canada, the European Economic
Community and the United States, 2 does not purport to undertake a
comprehensive comparative analysis of the anti-dumping laws of the
four jurisdictions. Its aim is, rather, to examine the core concepts and
some of the core salient features of the laws as developed in actual
practice, and to consider the problems that have arisen in these juris-
dictions and their solutions. For this purpose, section I will analyze
procedural issues, section II substantive issues of dumping, and section
III substantive issues of injury. The article concludes in section IV
with specific recommendations for change - both to municipal and to
multilateral anti-dumping systems.
I. PROCEDURE
A. The Actors
1. Administering Authorities
In all four jurisdictions, anti-dumping action has in practice been
delegated to special units within the Executive Branch3 which make
the decision whether or not protective measures against injurious
dumping should be taken on essentially technical grounds. The fact
that in these jurisdictions anti-dumping complaints enjoy a higher
popularity than other trade actions seems at least partly attributable to
the relatively streamlined and non-discretionary character of such
proceedings. 4
An important difference between Australia and the EEC on the
one hand, and the United States and Canada on the other hand, is the
separation of responsibilities for the dumping determination and. the
injury determination in the latter two countries. While the Australian
Customs Service (and now the Anti-Dumping Authority) and the
EEC Commission investigate both dumping and injury, the injury de-
terminations in the United States and in Canada are made by ,in-
dependent (but politically appointed) agencies: the U.S. International
Trade Commission (ITC) and the Canadian Import Tribunal. The
2. ANTI-DUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 1.
3. The two exceptions to the rule are the International Trade Commission in the U.S. and the
Import Tribunal in Canada, both of which are independent (but politically appointed) agencies in
charge of the injury investigations in the respective countries.
4. In addition, the fact that anti-dumping measures directly control the price of imports of
the dumped goods seems an important reason for the popularity of the anti-dumping instrument;
see Horlick, The United States' Anti-dumping System, in ANTI-DUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY ch. 4, § I (J. Jackson & E. Vermulst ed., University of Michigan Press
forthcoming 1989).
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U.S. Department of Commerce and Revenue Canada are in charge of
the dumping determination in the two countries.
Both types of structure have their advantages. The main advan-
tage of the bifurcated systems found in Canada and the U.S. would
seem to be that there are more guarantees for an objective - (suppos-
edly) mutually independent - examination of both conditions for im-
position of duties. The unified EEC and Australian systems, on the
other hand, minimize waste of resources and avoid substantive dis-
agreements casu quo overlaps inherent in any bifurcated system. 5
Perhaps the best system would have one truly independent and ob-
jective authority in charge of both the dumping and injury investiga-
tion.6  This does not, however, seem likely to happen in any
jurisdiction in the near future.7
The Legislative branches seldom become involved in concrete
cases.8 This might perhaps reflect the view that anti-dumping investi-
gations are a technical affair best left in the hands of the specialists. It
also means that there is relatively little room for political manoeuver-
ing behind the scenes. Of course, Horlick's observation that "it cannot
be completely ruled out that individual case handlers have sought to
guess what may (or may not) be on the Deputy Assistant Secretary's
5. See especially id. § 2.1.3. The recent institutional changes in Australia where an Anti-
dumping Authority was set up to recommend imposition of definitive duties to the Minister may
create their own overlap problems.
6. In this sense, see Steele, supra note I, § 2.3.
7. It is at present certainly not the case in either Australia or the EEC where the Customs
Service and the EEC Commission both advise potential complainants and - at a later stage -
then investigate whether the allegations of those same complainants are meritorious. Note, how-
ever, that the establishment of Australia's new Anti-Dumping Authority by the Anti-Dumping
Authority Act of 1988 (which entered into force on September 1, 1988) can be seen as an attempt
to establish an independent and objective authority in charge of making final recommendations
on both dumping and injury to the Minister. That having been said, one should bear in mind
that:
- The Anti-Dumping Authority is subject to the discretion of the Minister in terms of
general matters of policy (although it is not subject to direction in a particular
investigation);
- the Minister who oversees the Anti-Dumping Authority also is responsible for the Aus-
tralian Customs Service; and
- the Anti-Dumping Authority is an administrative fact-finding body only and does not
have judicial or quasi-judicial powers (of a court or a tribunal).
8. Although in the EEC the Council must decide to impose definitive anti-dumping duties,
the Council practically always rubber stamps the proposals of the Commission. See Bellis, The
EEC Anti-dumping System, in ANTI-DUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
ch. 3, § 2.1.2 (J. Jackson & E. Vermulst ed., University of Michigan Press forthcoming 1989).
See also E. VERMULST, ANTI-DUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, 196 (1987). But see Steenbergen, Some
Comments on EEC Anti-dumping Enforcement, in ANTI-DUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY ch. 7, § 14 (J. Jackson & E. Vermulst ed., University of Michigan Press
forthcoming 1989).
[Vol. 10:765
Summer 1989] Have Anti-Dumping Laws Become A Problem? 769
mind in terms of the politics of the case"9 applies equally in jurisdic-
tions other than the U.S. No system is or can be completely insulated
from political pressure.
Since 1980, judicial review of administrative anti-dumping deter-
minations has become more widespread in the four jurisdictions. t0
Not only has the number of appeals brought against administrative
determinations shown a sharp increase, but the courts themselves
would seem to have interpreted both their jurisdiction and the scope of
review expansively." In both respects, the United States - where
special courts were established to deal with trade matters - can be
seen as leading the way.
Although the input of the Judiciary is a relatively new phenome-
non in the anti-dumping area and one should therefore be careful to
draw conclusions, it would seem to this author that the possibility of
judicial review in itself is a laudable development in that it puts into
place an extra-administrative and de-politicized control on the admin-
istrations.' 2 The recommendation of the Australian Administrative
Review Council that a right of full merit review to the Administrative
Appeals Tribunal be established with regard to essentially outcome-
decisive administrative determinations indicates that the end of this
trend is not yet in sight. Similarly, it seems only a question of time
before the EEC Commission and the French Government will give up
their resistance to the Court of First Instance's hearing appeals of anti-
dumping determinations.' 3
9. Horlick, supra note 4, § 2.6.2.
10. In three out of four jurisdictions, the exception being Australia, judicial review seems
only available with regard to "final" determinations, i.e., determinations which have an outcome-
determinative character. For a description of judicial review in Australia, see also Waincymer,
Anti-dumping Regulations in the Australian Context: A Commentary, in ANTI-DUMPING LAW,
AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY ch. 7, § 17 (J. Jackson & E. Vermulst ed., University
of Michigan Press forthcoming 1989).
11. The exception would seem to be the European Court of Justice which has shown a
marked reluctance to subject administrative determinations to in-depth review, at least on sub-
stantive issues. See Bellis, supra note 8, § 2.8; Kuijper, Judicial Protection and Judicial Review in
the EEC, in ANTI-DUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY ch. 7, § 11 (J.
Jackson & E. Vermulst ed., University of Michigan Press forthcoming 1989); Van Bael, Lessons
for the EEC: More Transparency, Less Discretion, and at Last, A Debate?, in ANTI-DUMPING
LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY ch. 7, § 16 (J. Jackson & E. Vermulst ed., Uni-
versity of Michigan Press forthcoming 1989); Vermulst, Waer, Hof van Justitie der Europese
Gemeenschappen, 7 mei 1987, zaken 240/84 NTN Toyo Bearing Company Limited, 255/84 Nachi
Fujikoshi Corporation, 216/84 Koyo Seiko, 258/84 Nippon Seiko KK, 260/84 Minebea Company
Limited v. Raad, 36 SOCIAAL ECONOMISCHE WETGEVING 106 (1988).
12. On the legalistic character of trade proceedings in the United States, see Jackson, Per-
spectives on the Jurisprudence of International Trade: Costs and Benefits of Legal Procedures in
the United States, 82 MICHIGAN L. REV. 1570 (1984). Cf. Petersmann, Grey Area Policy and the
Rule of Law, J. WORLD TRADE, April 1988, at 23.
13. On judicial review in the EEC, see Bellis, supra note 8, § 2.8 and Kuijper, supra note 11.
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2. Private Parties
Anti-dumping complaints are normally brought by producers in
the importing country who feel that they suffer injury as a result of
imports dumped into the market of the importing country. The for-
eign producers at whom the complaint is aimed typically receive ques-
tionnaires from the authorities in the importing country (once such
authorities have decided that the complaint provides sufficient evi-
dence) and then can decide whether or not to cooperate in the pro-
ceeding (the decision is normally affirmative because a decision not to
cooperate may lead to use by the administering authorities of the "best
information available," and resulting high dumping margins). Im-
porters of the dumped merchandise (related or unrelated to the foreign
producer/exporters) likewise receive questionnaires and are offered
the opportunity to participate. These three categories can be classified
as the parties most directly affected by the outcome of the proceeding.
As a result of the increased legalization of anti-dumping proceedings,
most of these parties find it in their interest to retain specialized coun-
sel (the complainants sometimes do this in-house) to defend their in-
terests before the authorities. This may lead to significant expenses for
the parties concerned.
B. Investigation Techniques
A typical dumping proceeding involves five important stages:
(1) Initiation of the proceeding;
(2) sending of questionnaires to the parties concerned (typically for-
eign producers, domestic producers and importers of the mer-
chandise under investigation in the country of importation);
receipt and analysis of the questionnaire responses by the offi-
cials assigned to the investigation;
(3) verification of the questionnaire responses through on-site visits;
verification reports by the case handlers;
(4) provisional findings; opportunity to comment by the parties in-
volved; announcement and publication of the provisional find-
ings (not necessarily in that order);
(5) final findings; opportunity to comment by the parties involved;
announcement and publication of the final findings (again not
necessarily in that order).
While the four jurisdictions all follow these steps, this should not
obscure the important difference between the more quasi-adjudicatory
U.S. and Canadian approach and the more investigatory EEC and
Australian approach. The single most important cause of this differ-
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ence in the opinion of this author is the possibility of disclosure of
confidential information under administrative protective order in the
North-American continent. 14
In a nutshell, U.S. and Canadian law allow counsel for interested
parties (not the parties themselves!) to obtain certain confidential in-
formation submitted by other parties in the proceeding. The extent of
the disclosure of such information depends on the authority con-
cerned. In the United States the Department of Commerce has been
more willing than the ITC to disclose the information it received (this
would seem to have most benefitted counsel for the complainant do-
mestic industry who is able to analyze the information on dumping
submitted by the foreign respondents), while in Canada the Import
Tribunal is more liberal than Revenue Canada (thereby benefitting
counsel for the foreign respondents who can examine the injury infor-
mation submitted by the complaining Canadian industry). It should be
noted, however, that the U.S. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988 requires the ITC to yield all information now. As a result,
the current U.S. system would appear to be the most transparent.
The possibility of severe sanctions in case of breach of the protec-
tive order would thus far seem to have provided sufficient guarantees15
against disclosure by counsel to outsiders.' 6
In the EEC and in Australia,' 7 the investigating authorities are the
only ones with access to the confidential portions of the file, and the
non-confidential summaries are generally of limited value. This leads
to parties "shooting in the dark" at each other and to the undesirable
situation that in many cases there are no external checks on the inves-
14. See also Bello, Access to Business Confidential Information in Anti-dumping Proceedings,
in ANTI-DUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY ch. 7, § 7 (J. Jackson & E.
Vermulst ed., University of Michigan Press forthcoming 1989); Jacobs, Observations on the Anti-
dumping Law and Practice of The European Community, and Some Possible Reforms, in ANTI-
DUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY ch. 7, § 8 (J. Jackson & E. Vermulst
ed., University of Michigan Press forthcoming 1989); Taylor & Vermulst, Disclosure of Confiden-
tial Information in Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duty Proceedings Under U.S. Law.- A
Framework for the European Communities, 21 INT'L L. 43 (1987).
15. But see Bello, supra note 14, § 7, noting some incidences of unauthorized disclosure.
16. The GATT Anti-dumping Code provides in article 6:3 that
any information which is by nature confidential (for example, because its disclosure would
be of significant competitive advantage to a competitor or because its disclosure would have
a significantly adverse effect upon a person supplying the information or upon a person from
whom he acquired the information) or which is provided on a confidential basis by parties to
an anti-dumping proceeding shall, upon cause shown, be treated as such by investigating
authorities. Such information shall not be disclosed without specific permission of the party
submitting it.
In footnote 10, however, the Code acknowledges that "Parties are aware that in the territory of
certain Parties disclosure pursuant to a narrowly drawn protective order may be required."
17. For an overview of the Australian system, see Steele, supra note 1, § 2.6.
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tigators until it is too late, i.e., in court.18
C. Price Undertakings; Settlements
Price undertakings in the form contemplated by the 1979 Anti-
Dumping Code, 19 i.e., agreements between the foreign exporters and
the administering authorities in the importing country whereby the
former agree to revise their prices (or cease exports), are quite com-
mon in the European Communities and in Australia, but have been
used only infrequently in the United States and Canada.
The reasons for this practical difference seem two-fold. In the first
place, the system of undertakings fits more comfortably in jurisdic-
tions where the authorities have a considerable amount of discretion
throughout the proceeding as is the case in Australia and in the EEC.
In this respect it is worth noting that, in the more quasi-adjudicatory
Canadian and American systems, the procedural requirements for ac-
ceptance of an undertaking are rather burdensome. In the Canadian
context, the requirement that undertakings must be established prior
to a preliminary determination seems particularly unrealistic. 20 These
problematic requirements are probably the result of a certain legisla-
tive distrust of the executive agencies. Arguably, the decision whether
to accept an undertaking and, if so, under what conditions, vests more
discretion in the executive agencies (both in the negotiations leading
up to the undertaking and in the subsequent implementation) than a
semi-automatic decision to impose duties.
Secondly, it might well reflect an attitude on the part of the author-
ities in Australia and the EEC that acceptance of undertakings is a
preferable way of solving dumping problems in cases involving less
developed countries.
While the suspension agreements, contemplated in the 1979 U.S.
Trade Agreements Act, have been used only sporadically, extra-statu-
tory settlements, either in the form of quotas or in the form of special
18. See id., discussing the problems in Australia.
19. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Part I [hereinafter Anti-dumping Code of 1979], art. 7:1 provides that:
[p]roceedings may be suspended or terminated without the imposition of provisional meas-
ures or anti-dumping duties upon receipt of satisfactory voluntary undertakings from any
exporter to revise its prices or cease exports to the area in question at dumped prices so that
the authorities are satisfied that the injurious effect of the dumping is eliminated. Price in-
creases under such undertakings shall not be higher than necessary to eliminate the margin
of dumping.
20. See Magnus, The Canadian Anti-dumping System, in ANTI-DUMPING LAW AND PRAC-
TICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY ch. 5, § 2 (J. Jackson & E. Vermulst ed., University of Michigan
Press forthcoming 1989). See also R. Bierwagen, The Protectionist Bias in National Anti-dump-
ing Laws: An Appraisal of GATT Article VI and its Implementation; and Proposals for Negoti-
ation in the Uruguay Round, (1988) (unpublished manuscript), ch. IV, § iv.
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pricing schemes, have been used in the United States as a sui generis
remedy for solving anti-dumping disputes with high stakes (such as
those in the steel and semic6nductor sectors). 2'
D. Anti-dumping Duties
1. Lesser Duty Rule
An important difference between the United States and Canada 22
on the one hand, and the European Communities and Australia on the
other hand, is the rule in the latter jurisdictions that anti-dumping
duties should be lower than the dumping margins if lesser duties
would be sufficient to remove the injury caused by the dumping
("lesser duty" rule). 23
In Australia, the lesser duty rule has given rise to the phenomenon
of non-injurious FOB margins (NIFOBs). Thus, the Australian Cus-
toms Service will determine the minimum level of the producers' ex-
port prices at the FOB level which will ensure that no injury can be
caused. 24 If the NIFOB is lower than the dumping margin, the anti-
dumping duty will be set by reference to the NIFOB.
Similarly, the EEC Commission typically calculates injury mar-
gins, i.e., the margins by which prices of the foreign producers should
be raised in order to allow Community producers to cover their cost of
production and earn a "reasonable" profit. If the resulting margins
are lower than the dumping margins found, the duty will be set at the
level of the injury margin.
In the opinion of this author, the lesser duty rule seems a logical
21. See Horlick, supra note 4, § 2.3. See also, GATT Dispute Settlement Report, Japan -
Trade in Semi-Conductors, GATT, L/6309 (1988) (as yet unpublished); R. Kulms, DAS ANTI-
DUMPINGRECHT IM AMERIKANISCHEN UND EUROPAISCHEN RECHT: EINE UNTERSUCHUNG
ANHAND DER STAHLKRISE (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1988).
22. Note, however, that in Canada the Import Tribunal may give its advice as to whether the
imposition of a duty equal to the full amount/level of the dumping margin would be in the
Canadian national interest. In the Grain corn anti-subsidy proceeding, the Import Tribunal ad-
vised that a countervailing duty equal to the subsidy rate found by the Canadian authorities
would not be in the Canadian national interest. This seems to have been the only instance in
which the Import Tribunal advised in favor of application of what is, in essence, a lesser duty
rule.
23. This rule is in conformity with the desire of the signatories of the Anti-dumping Code.
Article 8:1 of the Code provides that,
the decision whether or not to impose an anti-dumping duty in cases where all requirements
for the imposition have been fulfilled and the decision whether the amount of the anti-
dumping duty to be imposed shall be the full margin or less, are decisions to be made by the
authorities of the importing country or customs territory. It is desirable that the imposition
be permissive in all countries or customs territories [of] Parties to this Agreement, and that
the duty be less than the margin, if such lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury
to the domestic industry.
24. See Steele, supra note 1, § 5.2.
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consequence of the GATT provision that anti-dumping duties should
only be imposed if the dumping has caused injury. Thus, if the injury
caused can be offset by a duty that is less than the margin of dumping,
arguably any relief should be limited to this duty.25 However, the
GATT Anti-dumping Code itself merely states that under such cir-
cumstances a lesser duty is desirable and therefore leaves it up to the
Code signatories whether or not to adopt a lesser duty rule. Again,
the absence of a lesser duty rule in the United States and in Canada
would seem to be a consequence of legislative hesitancy to give discre-
tion to the Executive.
In the European Communities and Australia the lesser duty rule
has worked well, especially to temper the high dumping margins often
found with respect to exports from non-market economies (and, more
recently, Japan). Jacobs provides an additional argument in favor of a
lesser duty rule:
[T]he conclusion which appeared to emerge from the Ann Arbor confer-
ence [is] that the practice of the Parties to the Code has led increasingly,
in all the jurisdictions considered, to an inflation of dumping margins by
the cumulative effect of increasingly strict interpretations of the various
components of the dumping calculation. Accordingly, the practice of
the European Community in treating as mandatory the provision that
the duty "should" be less than the dumping margin if such lesser duty
would be adequate to remove the injury is in principle to be preferred to
the practice of the United States and Canadian authorities. 26
In view of the above, the adoption of a lesser duty rule in the
U.S.27 and Canada might be recommended. A proper and sufficiently
detailed statutory framework for the lesser duty rule might alleviate
Congressional fears of providing the Executive with "too much" dis-
cretion. Uniform - standardized - language on the exact applica-
tion of the lesser duty rule could be developed within the GATT Anti-
Dumping Committee. At present, the Australian and EEC authorities
seem to have too much leeway in determining what constitutes a non-
injurious price level, especially in view of the confidential character of
complaining industry's and foreign producers' pricing data in the mar-
ket of the importing country (preventing external checks). This prob-
lem is exacerbated in cases where the authorities decide to establish a
25. See also Jacobs, supra note 14.
26. Id.
27. The retrospective assessment of anti-dumping duties in the United States which requires
a calculation on an entry-by-entry basis might pose certain problems for the application of a
lesser duty rule. One could, however, envisage a system in which the Commerce Department not
only checks each entry with the normal value, but also with a non-injurious minimum price,
determined by the ITC. Contrary to the retrospective character of the determination of dumping,
the lesser duty rule probably could only be applied on a prospective basis.
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target price for domestic producers which covers their costs of produc-
tion and a reasonable profit.
Within the GATT, clarity could be provided on a number of issues
such as whether the calculation of the injury margin should be made
on a producer-by-producer basis or on a country-by-country basis,
under what circumstances target prices could be used, what consti-
tutes a reasonable proht margin, etc. The GATT lesser duty rule
would work to ensure that any target price does not provide excessive
protection to the domestic industry.
2. Circumvention Problems
Anti-dumping duties are typically imposed on a country-wide ba-
sis. 28 Individual duties are normally applied to investigated exporters
who have cooperated fully during the investigation with one residual
duty rate set for all other exporters or potential exporters in the coun-
try of export. The method for determining the level of the residual
duty differs per jurisdiction.
The residual duty works to the disadvantage of new exporters or
exporters who did not cooperate with the investigation, who are, until
the first administrative review forced to pay a duty that bears no rela-
tionship to their costs or prices. From a policy point of view, however,
a residual duty makes sense because it prevents - to a certain extent
- circumvention. In the opinion of the author, a residual duty is a
necessary evil. Its unfairness vis-A-vis new or non-investigated export-
ers could, however, be mitigated through creation of special, expedited
reviews. A new GATT Code could provide special provisions on ex-
pedited reviews for non-investigated or new exporters.
The imposition of an anti-dumping duty on product x originating
in country X may create an incentive for the producers in that country
to move production to other countries ("country hopping") or to start
producing slightly different products that fall outside the scope of the
anti-dumping duty ("product-shifting"). 29 In this respect, four situa-
tions can be distinguished:
- production in the jurisdiction which imposed the anti-dumping
duty;
- production in a third country;
28. But see Video Cassette Recorders from Japan and Korea, 31 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L
240) 5 (1988), where the Commission initiated the proceeding against all Korean producers and
against two Japanese producers.
29. This product-shifting or country-hopping is facilitated by the globalization of the world
economy. For an interesting perspective on the changed world economy, see Drucker, The
Changed World Economy, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 768 (1986).
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- production of a slightly different product, upstream, down-
stream or sidestream (a "pinstriped" widget); and
- production of new products.
In some cases, the whole aim of any of the above strategies will be
circumvention of the anti-dumping duty. However, in many other
cases, the imposition of an anti-dumping duty will become a decisive
factor and lead to an investment or product-shifting decision that
might already have been reached on other grounds.
The GATT Anti-dumping Code does not address these issues. 30
In the absence of multilateral agreement to deal with these strategies, a
number of Code signatories have found it necessary - perhaps under-
standably - to act unilaterally against certain corporate practices that
they consider to constitute circumvention.
The EEC, for example, in June, 1987, adopted its 'parts' or 'screw-
driver' amendment to deal with intra-EEC assembly of parts and com-
ponents that, if imported as a complete item, would have been subject
to anti-dumping duties,31 provided that:
- the assembly or production is carried out by a related party;
- the assembly or production operation was started or substan-
tially increased after the opening of the anti-dumping investiga-
tion; and
- the value of parts or materials originating in the country of ex-
portation of the product subject to the anti-dumping duty is at
least 60 percent of the total value of the parts.
In the United States and Canada, the revolution occurred more
quietly when the Department of Commerce and the Import Tribunal
determined that, under certain circumstances, an anti-dumping duty
imposed on imports of the finished product, would also apply to im-
ports of parts or components.
In addition, in 1988, the United States adopted a provision to pre-
vent circumvention of anti-dumping duties through only minor altera-
tions of the dumped merchandise or through limited further assembly
in the U.S. or in third countries. 32 Furthermore, Horlick has pointed
30. See Koulen, Some Problems of Interpretation and Implementation of the GATT Anti-
dumping Code, in ANTI-DUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY ch. 7, § 10
(J. Jackson & E. Vermulst ed., University of Michigan Press forthcoming 1989).
31. The parts amendment is discussed extensively in Griffith, Anti-Dumping Duties on Parts
in the EEC, in ANTI-DUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY ch. 7, § 5 (J.
Jackson & E. Vermulst ed., University of Michigan Press forthcoming 1989). It should be noted
that, prior to adoption of the 'parts' amendment, CKD kits normally were already subjected to
anti-dumping duties imposed with respect to the finished product because of the customs classifi-
cation rules.
32. See Holmer & Bello, The 1988 Trade Bill: Is It Protectionist?, 5 INT'L TRADE REP. 1347,
1350 (1988). The circumvention provisions are regulated in Section 1321 of the Omnibus Trade
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out33 that the Commerce Department in the DRAM investigation in-
cluded future generation DRAMS, although this was questioned by
the ITC on "like product" grounds.
The Australian courts, on the other hand, currently consider the
identity of goods in the condition they are in at the point of entry.
Accordingly, unless the goods at the point of entry can be said to be
unassembled or disassembled with the essential character of the whole
(finished) product, e.g., CKD kits, they will be treated simply as
parts. 14
The increased globalization also affects the complainants who, in
certain cases, will source vital parts abroad or have the final product
assembled abroad. Obviously, the question then arises whether they
can still be considered as domestic producers in the country of
importation. 35
As of the moment of writing, there is no uniform approach in the
four jurisdictions towards these important issues which may have a
vital impact on foreign investment and on corporate planning. This
creates considerable uncertainty.
Product-shifting and country-hopping are new issues that should
have a high priority in the GATT negotiations. Product-shifting
could be addressed in part through a revised "like product" definition,
duly restrictive to prevent protectionist applications. 36 The customs
classification rules of the Harmonized Commodity Description and
Coding System could also provide a certain guidance. Thus, for exam-
ple, Rule 2 states that:
(a) Any reference in a heading to an article shall be taken to include
a reference to that article incomplete or unfinished, provided
that, as presented, the incomplete or unfinished article has the
and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107, 119 to be codified as
section 781 of the Tariff Act of 1930. They deal with four types of circumvention: (1) importa-
tion of parts and components into the United States for assembly into a product of the same class
or kind of merchandise as that which is subject to an anti-dumping duty order; (2) assembly or
completion of parts and components in a third country into a product of the same class or kind of
merchandise as the product subject to an anti-dumping duty order in the U.S.; (3) importation of
products with minor alterations (compared to the products subject to an anti-dumping duty or-
der); and (4) importation of newly developed products with the same basic characteristics as
those subject to an anti-dumping duty order. It is up to the Commerce Department to decide
whether to use these provisions in specific proceedings.
33. Horlick, supra note 4, § 2.4.1.
34. See Steele, supra note 1, § 4.1.
35. For more detail, see infra § III.B.
36. See Baker, "Like" Products and Commercial Reality, in ANTI-DUMPING LAW AND
PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY ch. 7, § 1 (J. Jackson & E. Vermulst ed., University of
Michigan Press forthcoming 1989), pointing out the need to address circumvention strategies
and suggesting possible solutions.
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essential character of the complete or finished article. It shall
also be taken to include a reference to that article complete or
finished (or failing to be classified as complete or finished by
virtue of this Rule), presented unassembled or disassembled.
(b) Any reference in a heading to a material or substance shall be
taken to include a reference to mixtures or combinations of that
material or substance with other materials or substances. Any
reference to goods of a given material or substance shall be
taken to include a reference to goods consisting wholly or partly
of such materials or substance ....
Thus, one could envisage an assumption that, if the widget and the
pinstriped widget fall under the same subheading of the Harmonized
System, they should normally be considered alike. Likewise, imports
of parts that fall under the same Harmonized System subheading as
the finished product, could be subject to the anti-dumping duty im-
posed with respect to the finished product. Of course, the Harmonized
System classification rules might sometimes be too broad and other
times overly restrictive. They could, therefore, never provide perfect
guidance.
As far as production of the dumped product in the country of im-
port or in third countries is concerned, it would seem to this author
that rules of origin might provide a logical framework for reference.
The problem is, of course, that there are no uniform rules of origin and
that, in addition, certain jurisdictions have many different sets of ori-
gin rules.
It would seem to be in the interest of all GATT Contracting Par-
ties to have uniform rules on circumvention. Such rules should strike
a balance between allowing legitimate business practices and ob-
structing clear attempts to evade the anti-dumping laws.
3. Sunset Provision
Australia, Canada, and the EEC all have sunset clauses under
which anti-dumping duties expire automatically after a certain time
(five years in Canada and the EEC; three years in Australia) unless a
request for continuation is received from the domestic industry. 37
Sunset provisions seem to be an efficient way of dealing with anti-
dumping duties in which the domestic industry has lost interest.
Adoption of a sunset clause should be seriously considered by the
United States and by the GATT Code signatories. As far as the
37. In Australia, anti-dumping duties automatically sunset after three years. In other words,
the complaining industry must lodge a new complaint which will form the basis for a new
investigation.
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United States is concerned, it would be an easy way for the Office of
Compliance to deal with the backlog of annual review cases.
E. Assessment of Anti-dumping Duties
The heart of any anti-dumping system is the actual assessment of
anti-dumping duties. This study has found widely diverging ap-
proaches to duty assessment in the four jurisdictions.
One should note as a starting point that the GATT does not pro-
hibit injurious dumping. GATT article VI merely states that dumping
is to be "condemned" if it causes material injury and that an anti-
dumping duty may be levied by Contracting Parties "in order to offset
or prevent dumping."
It follows that anti-dumping duties should not have the character
of a penalty for past dumping practices. They should merely be
designed to prevent or offset injurious dumping in the future on the
basis of findings of fact. Even where injurious dumping exists, imposi-
tion of duties is not mandatory under GATT or the Code, but merely
discretionary.
In Canada, Revenue Canada first determines whether dumping
took place during the investigation period (which is always in the
past). However, the dumping margin established for that period does
not really have any practical importance. Once the Import Tribunal
has issued a final affirmative injury determination, Revenue Canada
must determine within 6 months whether and at what level dumping
occurred during the 120 days between the preliminary Revenue Can-
ada determination and the final Import Tribunal determination. In
addition, Revenue Canada must set a prospective normal value for the
future.
The Canadian system, therefore, offers potential importers the op-
portunity to ascertain for themselves whether or not to purchase at a
certain price will attract liability for anti-dumping duties. In other
words, the importer can avoid payment of such duties as long as his
purchase price is above or equal to the normal value set by Revenue
Canada. The disadvantage of the Canadian system would seem to be
that the normal value is set by reference to past prices or costs and
therefore may not accurately reflect subsequent developments in do-
mestic prices or costs of the foreign producers.
In the United States the liability for payment of anti-dumping du-
ties is determined on a retrospective basis in the course of an annual
review. Thus, the rates set in the anti-dumping duty order that forms
the culmination of the original investigation in the United States, are
only an estimate of the liability. The United States system has the
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advantage that it is based on actual data and therefore supposedly
most realistically offsets any dumping that has occurred. Compared to
the Canadian system, however, it is less predictable for the importer
who does not know, at the moment of importation, whether or not and
to what extent he will be liable for payment of the duty. It also puts a
heavy burden in terms of time and expenses on foreign exporters.
In Australia, the Australian Customs service - and now the Anti-
Dumping Authority - will set a prospective normal value based on
the data obtained during the investigation period. Once a dumping
notice has been published, an anti-dumping duty will be levied only on
those sales transactions with regard to which the export prices shown
as the transaction value of the goods on entry are less than the normal
value.38 Like the Canadian system, Australia therefore offers Austra-
lian importers the opportunity to determine in advance whether
purchase at a certain price will attract liability for payment of anti-
dumping duties.3 9
The Australian and the EEC systems share the feature that duties
are set prospectively on the basis of the data gathered during the inves-
tigation period. As there is a substantial time lag between the investi-
gation period in an anti-dumping proceeding and the provisional and
final determinations, this means that in most cases anti-dumping du-
ties will be imposed at levels that may have nothing to do with the
prices or costs prevailing at the time that the duties are imposed.
More serious, however, is the practice in the EEC to typically im-
pose anti-dumping duties as a percentage of the CIF export price.
This percentage is applied to all future imports. In the mechanics of
the EEC system, this implies that the anti-dumping duty must be paid
whether or not the sale in question is actually made at a dumped
price. 40  While there are certain potentially mitigating factors (the
lesser duty rule; acceptance of undertakings; refund possibilities; re-
view possibilities and occasional imposition of an anti-dumping duty
in the form of a floor price), in reality these factors do not alleviate this
38. Note, however, that the Australian Customs Service recently decided to express the duty
as a percentage for the purpose of assessment of provisional securities prior to the final decision.
See Steele, supra note 1, § 3.4.
39. The only exception is where a product is imported which falls within the ambit of the
dumping notice but for which the Customs Service does not have a specific normal value, e.g.,
because it is a new model or because it is an existing model whose specifications changed. In
those circumstances, rather than hold the product up, the Customs Service will take a security
while determining the normal value. If, having done so, the Customs Service determines that the
export price is less than the normal value, it will require the payment of anti-dumping duties to
the extent of the difference; the security will be used to guarantee that the payment is made.
40. See Bellis, supra note 8, § 2.5 and Van Bael, supra note 11.
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structural problem in the normal case.41 This is especially so because
there is a growing reluctance within the EEC Commission to accept
undertakings.
In the opinion of this author, the United States', Canadian, and
Australian systems for assessment of anti-dumping duties could serve
as a model for improvement of the EEC system. GATT rules could be
developed to the effect that no anti-dumping duties should be imposed
on specific sales transactions unless there has been an administrative
determination that such transactions have actually been dumped (or
have been made at injurious prices).
F. Administrative Discretion
As far as discretion of the investigating authorities is concerned,
the EEC (most discretion) and the United States (least discretion) are
on opposing ends of the spectrum. Thus, in the United States imposi-
tion of anti-dumping duties is automatic once injurious dumping is
found and the duties must furthermore equal the dumping margin
found during the investigation, subject to fine-tuning during the ad-
ministrative reviews. 42 The investigation itself has a clearly quasi-ad-
judicatory character, is subject to strict time limits, and is relatively
transparent for the parties involved in the proceeding.
In the EEC, even if injurious dumping is found, the Community
authorities must then decide that imposition of protective measures is
in the interests of the Community (the decision is usually affirma-
tive).43 The level of the duty is equal to the dumping margin or the
injury margin, whichever is lower. Especially in its analysis of the
injury margin, the EEC Commission enjoys considerable discretion
because it is normally the only party with detailed information on
prices in the EEC market of both the EEC industry and the foreign
respondents. The absence of a system of disclosure of confidential in-
formation under protective order further supports the role of the Com-
mission as "examining magistrate."' '
Although Canada also has a "public interest" criterion and anti-
dumping action in Australia is permissive even if dumping and result-
ing injury have been found, in practice both countries impose anti-
41. For the EEC, see Bellis, supra note 8, § 2.5 and Van Bael, supra note 11.
42. The harsh effects of this rule are, to a certain extent, mitigated by the U.S. system of
retroactive assessment of anti-dumping duties.
43. Bellis, supra note 8, § 2.6. But see Bourgeois, EC Anti-dumping Enforcement - Selected
Second Generation Issues, in ANTITRUST AND TRADE POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, (Hawk ed. 1986) at 563.
44. On administrative discretion in the EEC, see Van Bael, supra note 11.
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dumping duties once dumping and resulting injury are determined to
exist.45 Like the EEC, Australia has a "lesser duty" rule in the form
of the non-injurious FOB margins.46
It would seem to this author that the Australian system leans more
towards the EEC47 while the Canadian system shows strong similari-
ties with the United States as far as administrative discretion or, more
precisely, lack thereof, is concerned. It should be noted that the quasi-
adjudicatory character of anti-dumping proceedings is most pro-
nounced in the United States in the Department of Commerce (dump-
ing) procedure and in Canada in the (injury) procedure before the
Import Tribunal.
Compared to the situation prior to 1980, however, procedures in
all four jurisdictions have become increasingly "legalized" with a con-
comitant decrease of administrative discretion. As Jackson has con-
cluded in a previous study dealing with the U.S. system of regulating
imports, this development would seem preferable to the system in the
"good old days when margins could be manipulated for the greater
good of the country."48 In a system with a considerably higher degree
of government officials' discretion,
[t]he dangers of corruption are high; the dangers of political manipula-
tion and back room deals are also high; and often the weaker segments of
the domestic economy (frequently including consumers) are the ones
who must pay for the resulting decisions that are made for the benefit of
the more powerful producing interests. The legalistic system permits
well-intentioned government officials to fend off certain types of particu-
laristic pressures (but, of course, no system will fend off all such
pressures).
Sometimes government officials, past, present or future, express con-
siderable impatience with the U.S. legalistic system and yearn for a sim-
pler structure. Often they are simply expressing a bias that can
frequently be perceived in government officials, that whatever system ex-
ists should leave to those government officials as much discretion and
elbow room as possible to make the necessary decisions because those
officials inherently feel that they will make the best decisions possible
49
45. But see Magnus, supra note 20, who mentions one case - Subsidized Grain from the
U.S.A., PI-1-87 - in which the public interest criterion was successfully invoked.
46. See Steele, supra note 1, § 5.2.
47. Compare Waincymer, supra note 10.
48. See Horlick, supra note 4, § 2.6.3.
49. Jackson, supra note 12, at 1583. Compare Corbet, quoted in Van Bael, supra note 11, on
his perception of the role of government officials in international trade regulation.
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II. DUMPING
A. Introduction
To determine whether dumping takes place, the authorities in the
country of importation must determine whether the export price of the
product is lower than the normal value after adjustments to bring both
back to the ex-factory level. The difference between the two is called
the margin of dumping. The dumping margin can be expressed as a
percentage or as an amount.
Different jurisdictions use different terms for elements of the
dumping determination. In this article, we follow the terminology of
the GATT and the GATT Anti-Dumping Code to the extent possible.
B. Normal Value
1. Normal Value Based on Home Market Sales
The preferred method for establishing normal value in all four ju-
risdictions is the use of prices of sales transactions in the domestic
market of the foreign producer, provided that such sales are (1) in the
ordinary course of trade and (2) permit a proper comparison with the
export sales.
The first condition is sometimes used to exclude sales to related
companies, distress sales, or special sales (e.g., sales to employees,
etc.). More importantly, this condition seems to have been the basis
for an informal understanding among the four jurisdictions analyzed
here during the Tokyo Round not to take into account sales below cost
under certain circumstances. 50
The second condition has been invoked to justify exclusion of
home market sales in negligible or small quantities. In this respect it is
noteworthy that the EEC and the United States apply the rule that
home market sales do not permit a proper comparison where such
sales amount to less than five percent - on a model by model basis -
of the sales to the EEC or to third countries respectively. 51 Canada
and Australia seem to make this determination on a case-by-case basis.
With the exception of the sales below cost concept, these exclu-
sions are logical because they prevent distortions or manipulation of
the sales prices in the domestic market. Of course, one can question
the rationale of the five percent rule, but it serves the dual purpose of
administrative convenience and predictability, and is no more arbi-
50. See infra, § 11.1.3.
51. As far as the EEC is concerned, this rule was recently confirmed by the European Court
of Justice in (Joined Cases 277 and 300/85) Canon Inc., Canon France, Canon Rechner Deutsch-
land, Canon (U.K.) v. Council (Oct. 5, 1988) (as yet unreported).
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trary than any other rule would be.52
2. No or Inadequate Home Market Sales
If the authorities in the importing country determine that there are
no home market sales in the ordinary course of trade or that such sales
do not permit a proper comparison, they can, pursuant to GATT and
the Anti-Dumping Code, base normal value on either:
- the comparable price of the like product when exported to any
third country (which may be the highest such export price but
should be a representative price); or
- the cost of production in the country of origin plus a reasonable
amount for administrative, selling and any other costs and for
profits.53
Third country exports is the preferred basis only in the United
States. Horlick points out 54 that the reasons for this would seem to be
a U.S. preference for "hard" price data (as opposed to "softer" cost of
production data) as well as the controversial requirement in the U.S.
statute that the Commerce Department should apply at least eight
percent profit in constructed value cases.
The other jurisdictions seem to prefer the cost of production crite-
rion, arguably because they assume that, if there is evidence that
export sales to their country are dumped, there is a likelihood that
sales to other export markets have also been made at dumped prices.
In addition, use of cost of production is often administratively
convenient.
3. Sales Below Cost/Constructed Value
In view of the absence of any wording in GATT or the GATT
Code to that effect, it is remarkable that all four jurisdictions consider
sales below fully allocated cost of production as not being in the ordi-
nary course of trade if they have been made over an extended period of
time in substantial quantities and do not permit recovery of all costs
within a reasonable period of time. The basis for this practice seems to
52. More fundamentally, one can question the logic of a comparison between domestic and
export prices as a basis for determining whether dumping exists. See Macrory, Cost of Production
as the Sole Measure of Dumping, in ANTI-DUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY ch. 7, § 12 (J. Jackson & E. Vermulst ed., University of Michigan Press forthcoming
1989); Herzstein, Dumping and Trade Liberalization: A Two-Tiered Approach to Reducing Anti-
dumping Disciplines Between Open Trading Partners, in ANTI-DUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY ch. 7, § 6 (J. Jackson & E. Vermulst ed., University of Michigan Press
forthcoming 1989). See also Horlick, supra note 4, § 3.1.1.
53. See General Agreement on Tarriffs and Trade, art. VI:l(b), and Anti-dumping Code of
1979, supra note 19, art. 2:4.
54. See Horlick, supra note 4, § 3.1.2.
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be a GATT document circulated in November 1978 on behalf of cer-
tain Parties to the Kennedy Round Anti-Dumping Code. 55 The essen-
tial thrust of this document can, in turn, be traced back to the U.S.
Trade Act of 1974 which for the first time included a provision on
sales below cost. The legislative history of the Trade Act clarifies both
its intended use and the limitations thereon as follows:
[T]his amendment is necessary to prevent foreign sales of merchandise,
which are made at less than the cost of producing such merchandise,
from being used as the basis for determining whether sales of such or
similar merchandise to the United States are at less than fair value. In
the absence of such a provision, sales made to the United States at less
than cost of production could escape the purview of the Act if sales in
the home market of the country of exportation or, as appropriate, to
third countries are also made at prices which fail to meet the cost of
production by an equal or greater amount.
These standards are designed to insure that sales made at less than
cost of production will not automatically be excluded from considera-
tion, for frequently it is normal business practice, both in foreign coun-
tries and the United States to sell obsolete or end-of-model-year
merchandise at less than cost. Similarly, certain products, such as com-
mercial airliners, typically require large research and development costs
before introduction and initially are sold at prices which do not reflect all
overhead costs. If, however, such prices will permit recovery of all costs
based upon anticipated sales volume over a reasonable period of time,
such sales will not be disregarded. 56
The twin observations by Horlick 7 that the cost-based normal
value calculation has grown in importance over the past eight years
and that simultaneously the requirements for finding sales below cost
have gradually been eroded (in the sense of "facilitated") would seem
to apply with different accents to all jurisdictions. It is therefore cer-
tainly regrettable that the international legal basis for excluding sales
at a loss is so shaky. Koulen 5 8 puts this as follows:
Obviously, this document, which merely states the view of a limited
number of parties which has never been formally endorsed by the then
Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, cannot be invoked as an author-
itative source of interpretation of the Code.
A cost-based normal value is not objectionable per se.5 9 Problems
55. See, Koulen, supra note 30, § 10. For an extensive overview of the sales below cost
concept, see Bierwagen, supra note 20, ch. 6.
56. Trade Reform Act of 1973, H. Rep. No. 571, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1973).
57. Horlick, supra note 4, § 3.1.3.
58. See Koulen, supra note 30, § 10.
59. For good arguments in favor of a cost-based approach, see Macrory, supra note 52. For
an explanation of the U.S methodology as regards cost of production and especially recent devel-
opments therein, see Kaplan & Kuhbach, Recent US. Developments in Cost of Production Analy-
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arise, however, when the cost of production is calculated in an arbi-
trary manner or in a manner which does not reflect economic reality.
In such cases the anti-dumping rules can easily be abused for protec-
tionist purposes and, by inflating the normal value, may lead to estab-
lishment of dumping margins where none (should) exist. In the
absence of detailed multilateral rules on cost of production and con-
structed value calculations, these dangers are very real.
The following comments might be made with regard to the cost of
production/constructed value methodology currently applied by the
four jurisdictions:
- The fully allocated cost standard is economically unsound (eco-
nomic theory generally considers it a perfectly normal business
practice to sell below fully allocated cost in the short term as
long as the marginal revenues exceed the marginal costs) 60 and,
in many jurisdictions, leads to application of a different stan-
dard of acceptable business conduct for foreign producers com-
pared to that applied to domestic producers under domestic
competition laws.61
- The "over an extended period of time" condition has been
watered down from the "business cycle" 62 to the last year or
even the (sometimes six months') investigation period. 63
- The "substantial quantities" test is considered fulfilled in at
least one jurisdiction (the United States) where at least ten per-
cent of domestic sales were made below cost (on a quantity
model-by-model basis). No justification other than administra-
tive convenience has been offered for the ten percent rule.
- The condition that the sales below cost must not permit recov-
ery of all costs within a reasonable period of time is not taken
seriously. The "reasonable period of time" is often equated
sis, in ANTI-DUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY ch. 7, § 9 (J. Jackson &
E. Vermulst ed., University of Michigan Press forthcoming 1989).
60. Compare Deardorff, Economic Perspectives on Dumping Law, in ANTI-DUMPING LAW
AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY ch. 2 (J. Jackson & E. Vermulst ed., University of
Michigan Press forthcoming 1989), discussing the circumstances under which finding sales below
cost actionable makes economic sense.
61. See Davey, Anti-dumping Laws in the GATT and the EC, in ANTI-DUMPING LAW AND
PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY ch. 7, § 2 (J. Jackson & E. Vermulst ed., University of
Michigan Press forthcoming 1989).
62. See Horlick, supra note 4, § 3.1.3.
63. Compare Kaplan & Kuhbach, supra note 59. The new EEC Regulation, Council (EEC)
2423/88, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 209) 1 (1988), now states explicitly that the investigation
period is the relevant period for determining whether sales in substantial quantities occurred over
an extended period of time at prices which do not permit recovery of all costs within a reasonable
period of time.
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with the "over an extended period of time" condition. 64 This is
particularly important for products where costs normally de-
cline sharply with time (the "learning curve"); prices below
cost at the beginning of production would be found "dumped",
even if cost recovery is likely.
- Where more than ten percent of domestic sales were made be-
low cost, at least one jurisdiction (the United States) then usu-
ally bases normal value on remaining sales above cost. The
U.S. will switch to the constructed value if more than 90% of
domestic sales were made below cost. In other words, the U.S.
will use remaining sales above cost as long as such sales repre-
sent more than 10%, but less than 90% of total domestic sales.
The EEC determines on a case-by-case basis what number of
sales below cost are still in the ordinary course of trade (20% in
Photocopiers). The EEC will not use remaining sales above cost
(but switches to constructed value) where during the investiga-
tion period the average cost of production was higher than the
average sales price. The Australian Customs Service seems to
use remaining sales above cost provided they are of a substan-
tial volume and in comparable quantities to the like goods ex-
ported to Australia. This determination is made on a case-by-
case basis.65 Use of remaining sales above cost may inflate the
normal value.
- The application of a profit margin is unrealistic in situations
where industries are apparently selling at a loss. 66 In addition,
the decision on what profit margin to use is very arbitrary in
most jurisdictions. In this respect, the statutory eight percent
minimum profit in the United States and the (recently codified)
EEC rule to base the reasonable profit preferably on the actual
profits made on profitable sales of the like product in the do-
mestic market (whether or not those sales are representative)
deserve special mention.67 On the other hand, the recently an-
nounced intention of the Australian government to use a zero
64. For a good example, see EEC Regulation 2423/88, supra note 63, art. 2(4)(A)-2(4)(b),
which lays down explicitly that the time period for both is the investigation period. See also
Vermulst & Waer, De Nieuwe EEG Anti-dumping Verordening 2423/88: Een Stille Revolutie, 37
SOCIAAL ECONOMISCHE WETGEVING 151-161 (1989).
65. See Steele, supra note 1, § 3.1.1.
66. See Macrory, supra note 52.
67. The Anti-dumping Code of 1979 merely provides in article 2:4 that,
[a]s a general rule, the addition for profit shall not exceed the profit normally realized on
sales of products of the same general category in the domestic market of the country of
origin.
Michigan Journal of International Law
profit margin in most cases seems a step in the right direction. 68
Likewise, Revenue Canada's use of the weighted average profit
on all domestic sales (including sales at a loss) as long as there
is a net profit seems relatively rational. 69
The combination of these factors offers strong evidence for the the-
sis that the cost-component of the anti-dumping law has lost touch
with reality. In addition, and perhaps more seriously, it makes cost of
production calculations extremely unpredictable for most businesses.
There is, in the opinion of this author, therefore, an urgent need for a
multilateral reappraisal of cost of production analysis in the anti-
dumping context.
Such a reappraisal might focus on the following issues:
- What types of costs should be included in calculating the cost
of production? How should inputs obtained from a related
party be valued? How should R & D and investment costs be
amortized? How should cost allocations in the case of multi-
product companies be made? What is the value of audited ac-
counts, established in accordance with generally accepted ac-
counting principles?
- How should the amount for SGA and a reasonable profit be
determined? By reference to costs and profit of the producer
who has been found selling at a loss? If so, on the basis of costs
and profit for the like product (and then as far as profit is con-
cerned on the basis of all domestic sales or only domestic sales
above cost), the same general category of products, the com-
pany as a whole? Should there not be a general "overriding"
rule against the use of costs or profit which are manifestly un-
reasonable or unrepresentative?
- Within what time frame should a company be expected to
cover its cost of production? The business cycle, the product
cycle, the last financial year or the investigation period? A re-
lated question is how start-up costs should be allocated. Specif-
ically, if start-up costs are incurred during the investigation
period, but can reasonably be expected to be recovered during
the product or the business cycle, should they not then be allo-
cated over one of the latter two periods instead of being attrib-
uted 100 percent to the investigation period?
- When does a company sell "substantial" quantities at a loss? Is
the ten percent rule used in the United States reasonable?
68. See Steele, supra note I. According to Steele, the ACS occasionally already used a zero
percent profit margin. Id., § 3.1.2.
69. See Magnus, supra note 20, § 3.
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Should there not be an opportunity for foreign producers to
prove that selling higher quantities at a loss is, in fact, normal
industry practice?
More generally, should there be an alignment defense, similar
to the one known in many countries in competition law in the
area of discriminatory pricing? In other words, if foreign pro-
ducers could establish for a certain import market that (1) all
producers sell below fully allocated cost and that (2) price de-
creases had been initiated by the complaining producers them-
selves, should the fact that they followed the pricing trends
subject them to anti-dumping duty liability?
Despite its recent origin, it may be unrealistic to expect an eco-
nomically rational cost of production/constructed value analysis for
what has become, in essence, a subtle web of import protection deci-
sions. The second-best option therefore would seem to reach multilat-
eral standardization to prevent diverging and ever expanding
unilateral interpretations of sales below cost.
4. Non-market Economies
The treatment of allegedly dumped imports from non-market
economies under the anti-dumping law is anomalous. Backed up by
the second Supplementary Provision to paragraph I of article VI
GATT, 70 the four jurisdictions have used the freedom that the GATT
regime essentially permits as far as the application of anti-dumping
action against non-market economies is concerned, to develop the so-
called surrogate producer concept. This means that the authorities ig-
nore the nominal prices or costs in the non-market economies and,
instead, base normal value on the prices or costs of a producer of the
like product in a market economy. In most jurisdictions, the authori-
ties are often forced to use the prices or costs of a producer located in
an economy at a substantially higher level of economic development
than the non-market economy under investigation. Needless to say,
this can inflate the normal value.
More fundamentally, the surrogate producer concept by its very
nature does not take into account that the non-market economy pro-
70. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Annex 1, Ad Article V2(2) acknowledges that,
it is recognized that, in the case of imports from a country which has a complete or substan-
tially complete monopoly of its trade and where all domestic prices are fixed by the State,
special difficulties may exist in determining price comparability for the purposes of para-
graph 1, and in such cases importing Contracting Parties may find it necessary to take into
account the possibility that a strict comparison with domestic prices in such a country may
not always be appropriate.
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ducer may, in fact, have certain comparative advantages that the sur-
rogate producer does not have.
Further, the choice of the surrogate producer is very unpredictable
and often depends on practical considerations (such as finding a pro-
ducer who is willing to cooperate) that have little to do with economic
reality. Finally, the surrogate producer concept offers opportunities
for manipulation by the parties to the investigation.
Section 1316 of the United States Omnibus Trade and Competi-
tiveness Act of 1988 has made an effort to alleviate the unfairness in-
herent in the surrogate producer concept by making the so-called
"factors" or "simulated constructed value" test the preferred method
of calculating normal value.7 1 Under the factors test, the Department
of Commerce must use the factors of production (hours of labor,
quantities of raw materials, amounts of energy and representative capi-
tal costs) used in producing the merchandise in the non-market econ-
omy. In other words, the factors test requires a two-step approach:
- identification and quantification of the factors of production
used in the non-market economy in producing the merchandise
under investigation; and
- valuation of those factors in an appropriate market economy.
While the factors test is not a panacea 72 and may raise many of the
same ideological and practical problems that exist in cases of applica-
tion of the surrogate producer method, it nevertheless would seem to
be a step in the right direction in that it applies a more predictable
standard to anti-dumping proceedings involving non-market econo-
mies than the surrogate producer procedure. As such, it sets an exam-
ple that deserves to be studied carefully by the other jurisdictions and
in GATT.
C. Export Price
All jurisdictions would seem to calculate the export price on the
basis of the price paid or payable by the importer.
In cases where the importer is related to the exporter, the jurisdic-
tions construct the export price by taking the resale price to the first
independent customer in the country of importation and deducting the
costs incurred between importation and resale (as well as the costs
71. See Ehrenhaft, The Application of Anti-dumping Duties to Imports from "Non-Market
Economies", in ANTI-DUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY ch. 7, § 3 (J.
Jackson & E. Vermulst ed., University of Michigan Press forthcoming 1989). For a critique of
the factors test, see Horlick & Shuman, Nonmarket Economy Trade and U.S. Anti-dumping/
Countervailing Duty Law, 18 INT'L L. 807, 825-827 (1984).
72. Ehrenhaft, supra note 71.
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incurred by the foreign producer from the moment the product left the
factory). Such costs include the selling, administrative and other gen-
eral ('SGA') expenses of the related importer and, in most jurisdic-
tions, a reasonable profit for the importer (the United States does not
include a reasonable profit). 73
Different jurisdictions apply different methods for establishing
what constitutes a reasonable profit. To the extent that - in a related
party situation - it may be a perfectly logical corporate decision to
have profits accrue to the mother company in the foreign country, one
can criticize the assumption that a subsidiary company in the import-
ing country should make a profit.
D. Adjustments
Once normal value and export price have been established pursu-
ant to the methods discussed above, adjustments must be made to both
in order to effect a fair comparison. The GATT Code rules on adjust-
ments are extremely sketchy:
In order to effect a fair comparison between the export price and the
domestic price in the exporting country . . . or, if applicable, the price
established pursuant to the provisions of Article VI: 1 (b) of the General
Agreement [third country exports or constructed value], the two prices
shall be compared at the same level of trade, normally at the ex-factory
level, and in respect of sales made at as nearly as possible the same time.
Due allowance shall be made, in each case, on its merits, for the differ-
ences in terms and conditions of sale, for the differences in taxation, and
for the other differences affecting price comparability. 74
Adjustments are very important in practice and, in the typical
case, give rise to most discussions. At the same time, the subject of
adjustments is technical and complicated and a thorough analysis
could easily fill a book. For purposes of this study, we raised one cru-
cial question: are adjustments, as applied administratively, fair or are
they biased in favor of or against dumping findings?
There seems to be consensus among the authors of the four coun-
try studies of the project from which this article grows that the legal
and/or practical application of adjustments displays a tilt towards
finding dumping. Although the accents differ by jurisdiction, this tilt
is most clear in situations where foreign producers sell in their home
and export markets through related sales organizations. In such cases,
73. For an excellent analysis of U.S. practice with regard to adjustments, see UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STUDY OF ANTI-DUMPING ADJUSTMENTS METHODOL-
OGY AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STATUTORY CHANGE (Washington D.C.: Department of
Commerce, 1985). Compare Koulen, supra note 30, § 10.
74. Anti-Dumping Code of 1979, supra note 19, art. 2:6.
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the authorities essentially establish the export price at an ex-works
level while leaving (some) overhead expenses in the normal value,
thereby inflating the latter. The tilt seems most pronounced in the
EEC.75
In addition, the fact that adjustments are not made automatically,
but have to be proven by the foreign producers, may put a heavy evi-
dentiary burden on those producers and provides the case handlers
assigned to the investigation with a large amount of discretion. This
applies, in particular, to the requirement in most jurisdictions that ad-
justments for differences in terms and conditions of sale will only be
granted if the terms and conditions of sale bear a direct relationship to
the sales under consideration. 76
During the past eight years administrative practice towards grant-
ing adjustments seems to have become increasingly restrictive. The
only justification offered is frequently administrative convenience. 77
To the extent that restrictive interpretations preclude a "fair" compar-
ison, they do not seem justifiable under article VI.
There is a need for multilateral detailed rules on adjustments.
While the GATT approach in itself seems sound, it is much too vague
to prevent Contracting Parties from adopting concrete interpretations
that seem at odds with the basic GATT aim of a "fair" comparison.
E. The Dumping Margin
There is a striking similarity between the four jurisdictions studied
here as far as the calculation of the dumping margin is concerned in
view of the fact that the Anti-Dumping Code does not give any gui-
75. Bellis, supra note 8, § 3.3.
76. In the recent case of Kanthal Australia Pty Ltd v. Minister for Industry, Technology &
Commerce [N. G 259 (1986) and No. G 564 (1987)], Sydney Registry (Dec. 28, 1987) the Aus-
tralian Federal Court held that the disallowance of adjustments for SGA on the basis that they
were "fixed expenses which would be incurred whether or not sales are made" was wrong. The
Court held that the correct test was that "only those costs which in an ordinary arms length
transaction one would expect to be reflected in the price of the goods sold to Australia should be
taken into account. If there are other costs in the domestic market which one would not expect
to be reflected in an arms length price of sales to Australia then they should be considered for
allowance." The Court seems to be saying that one must look at the circumstances of selling in
the domestic market of the exporting producer and of selling for export to Australia. If there are
factors involving costs in selling to one market the recovery of which should be expected in the
price to that market, and which are not present or relevant to selling to the other market (and so
would not be expected to be included in or recovered by the price to that market), then an
adjustment should be granted.
77. For a telling example, see the recent amendments to the EEC anti-dumping Regulation,
Council (EEC) 2423/88, supra note 62, especially Article 2 (10) (e) providing that individual
adjustments having an ad valorem effect of less than 0.5% of the price or value are insignificant
and may be disregarded. This rule does not apply to the netting back of the constructed export
price.
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dance. All four typically calculate the normal value on an average
basis and then compare the average with each export sale. None of the
jurisdictions compensate for export sales above the average normal
value (negative dumping); although the U.S. statute has included ex-
press authority to do so since 1984, it has been used only once since
then. This method works in favor of finding dumping. 78
III. INJURY
A. Like Product
The GATT Anti-Dumping Code defines a like product as:
a product which is identical, i.e., alike in all respects to the product
under consideration, or in the absence of such a product, another prod-
uct which, although not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely
resembling those of the product under consideration.
Australia and the European Communities have essentially adopted
the Code definition integrally and, in practice, put most emphasis on
physical likeness. In exceptional cases, however, both have displayed
a certain willingness to look at substitutability in the marketplace.
Furthermore, Australia has taken the side of Canada and the United
States in a number of GATT disputes involving like product and do-
mestic industry definitions.79
Canadian and U.S. law, on the other hand, explicitly mention
"4uses" as a factor to be considered in order to determine whether
products are alike. ITC and Import Tribunal practice would seem to
confirm that functional similarity is an important factor in determin-
ing which domestic products should be considered like the imported
dumped products. Thus, functional similarity seems to have played an
important role in the Canadian decision that zippers produced in Can-
ada are like imported finished or partly finished zippers. The Cana-
dian decision that Canadian cattle producers can bring a case against
imported beef and the American decisions that Californian grape
growers and Florida orange growers can bring cases against respec-
tively French and Italian wine and Brazilian frozen concentrated or-
ange juice also seem at least tangentially a consequence of the
functional similarity test.80
78. Compare Herzstein, supra note 52, n.1. See also Davey, Anti-dumping Laws: A Time
for Restriction (revised manuscript for publication), in the 1988 proceedings of the FORDHAM
CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE, EUROPEAN/AMERICAN ANTITRUST AND TRADE LAW, § II.A.I
(Hawk ed. 1989).
79. See Baker, supra note 36.
80. GATT dispute settlement panels have held that cattle producers and grape growers do
not produce beef and wine and therefore do not form part of the domestic industry. See id. n.7.
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In the opinion of this author, this functional similarity test does
not conform to the present GATT definition of like product.8 I
Although a like product definition on the basis of functional similarity
seems broader than a definition based on physical likeness (physically
alike products will always compete in the market, but functionally
similar products need not be physically similar), it is not necessarily
more protectionist. By broadening the scope of the affected domestic
industry, it may dilute the impact of the injury.
It might be worth considering whether the present physical simi-
larity test in the Code could be expanded to include a functional simi-
larity test. If conclusive proof (e.g., on the basis of cross-elasticity of
demand tests) could be offered that imported coffee at dumped prices
hurts domestic chicory producers, the like product definition should
not preclude relief on technical grounds that bear no relation to what
goes on in the marketplace. In addition, a like product test, based on
functional similarity. might deal with some of the more obvious cir-
cumvention strategies (the "pinstriped" widget).8 2
B. Domestic Industry
There must be injury to the domestic industry producing the like
product. Magnus83 has pointed out that this requirement has given
rise to four issues in Canada:
(I) Does the activity carried on by the domestic industry constitute
production? (Import Tribunal: Cleaning and repackaging oper-
ations do not amount to production).
(2) Is the production activity carried on by the complainant? (Im-
port Tribunal: Complaining cattle growers produce beef).
(3) Is the production activity carried on in the importing country?
(Import Tribunal: Steel plate, produced from Canadian contin-
uous cast slabs of steel, but shipped to the United States for hot
rolling, annealing, pickling and cutting, before being shipped
back to Canada for sale, is not produced in Canada; imports of
U.S. produced cars into Canada by complainants should not be
included in the injury analysis).
(4) Is the production intended (and actually used) for domestic con-
sumption? (Import Tribunal: Out of the total Canadian pro-
duction of pentaerythritol only the portion consumed in Canada
81. Compare Bierwagen, supra note 20, at 38, who agrees with this conclusion.
82. For more detail, see Baker, supra note 36.
83. See Magnus, supra note 20, § 4.
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must be taken into account; exported cars are not relevant for
injury analysis).
Horlick84 has pointed to a fifth - more procedural - issue:
(5) Does the complainant actually represent (a major proportion
of) the domestic industry? (Commerce: Yes, unless a majority
of the industry shows its opposition).
Where these questions have arisen in the other jurisdictions, they
have been answered in an ad hoc manner. This is logical because the
GATT and the GATT Code rules do not go into sufficient detail to
provide a clear answer to most of these questions.
It would seem to this author that in many cases the lacunae have
been filled in favor of domestic complainants. Thus, a complainant in
the U.S. does not have to prove that he represents the domestic indus-
try. In most jurisdictions there is hardly any substantive check to see
whether the activities carried out by the domestic producers constitute
production and whether the production is carried on in or outside the
country of import. In Australia, it is sufficient for imposition of anti-
dumping duties if the Australian produced merchandise contains 25
percent Australian content.85 By way of comparison, in the context of
its parts investigations, the EEC applies a 60 percent (value of parts
originating in the country where the dumped finished products origi-
nate) - 40 percent (value of parts originating in other countries) rule
without taking into account where the complainants source. In the
context of its undertakings policy in parts cases, the EEC would even
seem to require 40 percent EEC content, again without considering
whether the complaining industry complies with that rule.
Horlick 86 raises a very pointed question in the context of his dis-
cussion of the High Capacity Pagers proceeding:
If X percent value added in a third country is insufficient to change the
country of origin of an imported end product, should a U.S. producer of
that end product who only adds the same percent in the U.S. have stand-
ing to complain?
There is a need for uniform answers to the above questions that
can only come from multilateral agreement. Such agreement should,
in this author's opinion, be aimed at applying the same rules to domes-
tic complainants and foreign respondents, both procedurally and
substantively.
84. See Horlick, supra note 4, § 4.2.1.
85. Under the amendments to Australia's anti-dumping laws, which came into effect on Sep-
tember 1, 1988, any person may now bring a complaint as well as or instead of the domestic
industry producing the like product.
86. Horlick, supra note 4, § 4.2.1.
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As far as procedure is concerned, the EEC practice of sending out
(injury) questionnaires to domestic producers and verifying their re-
sponses might serve as an example to the other jurisdictions, assuming
that such a questionnaire would request information on the issues
above (this is presently not the case).
As regards substantive rules, the first-best option might be stand-
ardization of origin rules and explicit application of the national
treatment obligation to those rules. Failing standardization (most
countries apply their own set(s) of origin rules), there could at least be
a requirement that the same origin rules be applied to domestic and
foreign producers within the context of anti-dumping proceedings.
B. Material Injury
The domestic industry producing the like product must have suf-
fered material injury as a result of the dumped imports. Material in-
jury in this sense has three components (satisfaction of one of the three
is sufficient for an affirmative injury finding):
- The domestic industry is suffering material injury during the
investigation period;
- the domestic industry is not suffering material injury during the
investigation period, but can reasonably be foreseen to suffer
such injury in the very near future (threat of material injury);
- there is not yet a domestic industry producing the like product,
but there would have been such an industry in the absence of
the dumped imports (material retardation of the establishment
of an industry).
Although the GATT Anti-Dumping Code and all four jurisdic-
tions provide lists of indicators that should be considered in determin-
ing whether there is material injury and, if so, whether it is caused by
the dumped imports, any determination on this point is obviously ex-
tremely subjective. The subjective character of injury determinations
is probably, to a large extent, unavoidable. However, there is the addi-
tional problem that two of the four jurisdictions analyzed in the
broader study from which this article draws - the exceptions being
Canada and, since adoption of the Omnibus Trade and Competitive-
ness Act of 1988, presumably the United States - consider injury in-
formation as confidential and not susceptible to disclosure to the
opposing side to any meaningful extent. This prevents external checks
during the investigation on the accurateness of the data and the inter-
pretation thereof by the authorities.
As more precise substantive rules seem hard to envisage, improve-
ments could, for example, focus on transforming the investigatory
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character of injury investigations. The Canadian adjudicatory pro-
ceeding before the Import Tribunal with in camera hearings for the
purpose of receiving and cross-examining confidential information
submitted by the other side (and with a right of counsel to have access
to all confidential information submitted by other parties to the inves-
tigation) seems to have worked well and could serve as an example for
the other jurisdictions.
D. Causation
Although one can technically separate the requirements that there
must be material injury and that such injury must have been caused by
the dumping, the two are obviously interrelated. Indeed, many trend
indicators for assessing whether material injury occurred will simulta-
neously point to the direction where the injury came from. Neverthe-
less, for purposes of analysis, the distinction has a certain value.
The 1967 Anti-Dumping Code required that the dumped imports
be demonstrably the principal cause of injury. In reaching this deter-
mination, the authorities were required to weigh, on one hand, the
effect of the dumping and, on the other hand, all other factors taken
together which might be adversely affecting the industry.
This rather stringent causal link was replaced by the much weaker
phrase in the 1979 Code that it must be demonstrated that the dumped
imports are, through the effects of dumping, causing material injury. 87
The Code further provides that other causes of injury, such as the vol-
ume and prices of non-dumped imports, contraction in demand or
changes in consumption patterns, trade restrictive practices of and
competition between the foreign and domestic producers, and develop-
ments in technology and the export performance and productivity of
the domestic industry, should not be attributed to the dumped
imports.
It is very difficult to detect common causation trends in the four
jurisdictions studied here. Indeed, the most interesting common trend
that this author has been able to discern is the practice in all four
jurisdictions to cumulate imports from several sources under investi-
gation for purposes of determining whether injury is caused by the
dumped imports. Assuming that dumped imports from several
sources compete with each other and with the domestically produced
like product, it makes sense from an administrator's policy point of
view to cumulate such imports for purposes of the injury analysis. On
the other hand, cumulation tends to ignore differences in market share
87. Anti-Dumping Code of 1979, supra note 19, art. 3:4.
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and differences in market position of the producers and the countries
concerned, such as moment of entry and price setter or price taker.
All jurisdictions cumulate imports from the producers found sell-
ing below normal value from one country (producer cumulation). To
what extent the recent EEC determination in the Video Cassette Re-
corders proceeding to initiate and take protective action against two
Japanese producers is an exceptional case or the beginning of a new
trend to de-cumulate at the producer level remains to be seen.
The four jurisdictions generally also cumulate imports from sev-
eral countries if the proceeding has been initiated against those coun-
tries (country cumulation). At least one jurisdiction (Canada),
however, would seem to provide an opportunity for de-cumulation
under certain circumstances (for example if the dumping margins
found with respect to producers in one country are significantly lower
than those found with regard to other producers in other countries).
The EEC has occasionally de-cumulated in cases where producers in a
certain country had a minimal market share or did not undercut the
prices of EEC producers. To the extent that such de-cumulation rep-
resents an effort to make allowance for the position of the smaller -
usually new - suppliers/price takers, it is a useful concept that might
be multilateralized in GATT.
How de-cumulation should operate is another matter. General
rules in absolute terms are hard to envisage in view of the different
characteristics of industries and markets concerned. One could, how-
ever, imagine a rule providing that a country with a significantly lower
export volume or a significantly lower dumping margin (or a combina-
tion of both) than other countries involved in the proceeding, would be
assumed not to cause material injury. Such a rule would be particu-
larly appropriate if the country in question was a new entrant develop-
ing country.
An issue that has raised considerable controversy in the United
States, but has been largely ignored in the other jurisdictions concerns
the question whether the causal link should relate to the dumping
(margins analysis) or to the dumped imports (imports analysis). Pro-
ponents of the margins analysis argue that the size of the dumping
margin should play a certain role in the causation analysis. Thus, for
example, if the dumping margin is five percent, but the margin of price
undercutting is 45 percent, this might be an indication that any injury
caused by the dumped imports is not caused by the dumping. In addi-
tion, imposition of an anti-dumping duty of five percent would not
alleviate the injury suffered by the domestic producers in such a fac-
tual constellation. The U.S. Court of International Trade has held
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that the International Trade Commission is not obliged to, but may,
take into account the size of the dumping margins. The wording of
the GATT Anti-Dumping Code would seem to contemplate a margins
analysis in that it requires in article 3:4 that it must be demonstrated
that the dumped imports are, through the effects of the dumping, caus-
ing injury. In the opinion of this author, the size of the dumping mar-
gin should logically be a factor in the analysis of causation. This could
be made explicit in the Code.
An important factor in EEC injury investigations has been the
presence on the Community market of other low-priced imports not
under investigation. In such cases, the EEC Commission usually gives
the complaining industry the option of bringing an additional com-
plaint against those other imports (unless there is no evidence at all of
dumping and resulting injury) or having the proceeding against the
original respondents terminated on the basis of no injury. As practi-
cally all anti-dumping proceedings are initiated following industry
complaints and therefore inherently harbor the danger of manipula-
tion by the complaining industry (e.g., domestic industry x competes
with industry y in country Y, but imports from or has price agree-
ments with industry z in country Z, therefore bringing an anti-dump-
ing complaint against producers in country Y, but not against
producers in country Z), the EEC policy to a certain extent minimizes
this danger. In this respect, it could serve as an example for other
jurisdictions.8 8
Finally, an issue that seems to have given rise to argument in the
United States89 is whether for purposes of the injury analysis, the In-
ternational Trade Commission should look only at the impact of the
dumped transactions or at the "class or kind of merchandise" which
has been determined to have been dumped by Commerce. The prob-
lem arises because Commerce does not give credit for negative dump-
ing and then calculates one weighted average dumping margin for the
whole "class or kind of merchandise." The authorities in the other
jurisdictions would seem to proceed in the same manner and, conse-
quently, likewise consider the injurious impact of the dumped and
non-dumped imports as a whole, ignoring the distinction between
dumped and non-dumped sales transactions.
88. Compare Ehrenhaft, supra note 71, § 3, who proposes amending the anti-dumping law so
as to permit exporters to demonstrate that they are not "dumping" (or not causing injury EAV) if
reasonable quantities of similar products are available on the market of the importing country at
even lower prices from sources not engaged in sales at dumped prices.
89. See Stein, Treatment for Injury Purposes of Transactions not at L TFV, in ANTI-DUMPING
LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY ch. 7, § 15 (J. Jackson & E. Vermulst ed., Uni-
versity of Michigan Press forthcoming 1989).
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While it would seem to make sense to consider only the impact of
the dumped sales transactions (before calculating a weighted average
margin on all transactions), such an examination could be difficult to
administer, especially in the bifurcated U.S. and Canadian systems.90
IV. SHORTCOMINGS IN THE GATT ANTI-DUMPING CODE AND IN
THE NATIONAL ANTI-DUMPING LAWS; PROPOSALS
FOR CHANGE
Many economists would argue that the economic justification for
anti-dumping action is weak.91 In this, however, the anti-dumping sys-
tem does not stand out from other trade protection instruments.
There have also been many commentators who have pointed out
that anti-dumping laws, which in a way can be seen as the interna-
tional component of national competition laws, in fact pursue different
objectives and reach different - sometimes opposite - results.92
While both types of criticism have their value, they do not, in the
opinion of this author, provide compelling arguments to abolish anti-
dumping laws altogether. Anti-dumping laws serve an important
function as "interface" mechanism:
As world economic interdependence has increased, it has become more
difficult to manage relationships between various economies. This prob-
lem can be analogized to the difficulties involved in trying to get two
computers of different makes to work. To do so, one needs an "inter-
face" mechanism to mediate between the two computers. Likewise, in
international economic relations, and particularly trade, some interface
mechanism may be necessary to allow different economic systems to
90. Id.
91. For a lucid overview of such arguments, see Davey, supra note 78.
92. See Bierwagen, supra note 19, ch. V. See also Vermulst, EEG Anti-dumping en Meded-
ingingsrecht: Twee Handen op Een Buik?, 36 SOCIAAL ECONOMISCHE WETGEVING 430 (1988);
The Interface of Trade/Competition Law and Policy, 56 ANTITRUST L. J. 397-460 (1987); Victor,
Task Force Report on the Interface Between International Trade Law and Policy and Competition
Law and Policy, 56 ANTITRUST L. J., 463 (1987); Applebaum & Grace, U.S. Antitrust Law and
Anti-dumping Actions Under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 56 ANTITRUST L. J.
497; GREY, TRADE POLICY AND THE SYSTEM OF CONTINGENCY PROTECTION IN THE PER-
SPECTIVE OF COMPETITION POLICY (1986); ORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION &
DEVELOPMENT, COMPETITION AND TRADE POLICIES/THEIR INTERACTION (1984); Victor,
Anti-Dumping and Anti-Trust: Can the Inconsistencies Be Resolved?, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
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trade together harmoniously. 93
Over the past eight years, the anti-dumping system has become one
of the most important (if not most precise) interfaces in international
trading relations. 94 The apparent need felt for anti-dumping action is
also clear from the fact that even in the proposed U.S.-Canada free
trade agreement 95 and in the free trade agreements between the EEC
and EFTA countries, anti-dumping action remains possible (while, as
far as the former is concerned, anti-dumping action is supposed to be
abolished after five years, it remains to be seen whether this plan will
materialize). From a pragmatic point of view, abolition of anti-dump-
ing laws is therefore not really an option.
While one could argue with some justification that the anti-dump-
ing actions as presently applied are little more than thinly disguised
safeguard actions, it should nevertheless be borne in mind that the
technicalities involved, especially in the calculation of the dumping
margin, offer at least some guarantees for limiting the harmful effects
on international trade of the anti-dumping instrument.
Rather, the objective for international reform should therefore be
to make the anti-dumping system a better functioning interface by im-
proving its quality. Economic rationalization and injection of compe-
tition law considerations might be useful reference points. Before
suggesting possible improvements, however, we need to analyze the
defects in the international and national frameworks for anti-dumping
action.
It is clear that the GATT Anti-Dumping Code is too vague. This
vagueness has allowed the jurisdictions analyzed in this study to im-
plement unilateral interpretations, either in law or in practice, and
claim GATT-consistency where it may not exist. In the absence of
Code-clarity, such claims are hard to refute.
It would seem that many of the interpretations adopted by the four
jurisdictions analyzed here either clarify unclear and opaque elements
of the Anti-Dumping Code or deal with issues that were simply not
addressed in the Code.
The difficulty with these unilateral interpretations is that they typi-
cally go in the direction of facilitating anti-dumping findings and/or
expanding the scope of anti-dumping measures. This problem is exac-
93. J. Jackson & W. Davey, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
(2d ed. 1986) at 650-51.
94. See also the summary of the discussion during the conference in Ann Arbor by Denton,
reproduced in COMPARATIVE ANTI-DUMPING LAW, supra note 1, app. 1.
95. For a description of the FTA between and U.S. and Canada, see Hart, Dumping and
Free-Trade Areas, in ANTI-DUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY ch. 7, § 5
(J. Jackson & E. Vermulst ed., University of Michigan Press forthcoming 1989).
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erbated by the fact that interpretations proposed in one jurisdiction are
sometimes justified on the ground that other jurisdictions have
adopted similar or even broader interpretations. Steele96 provides the
following illuminating example in the Australian context:
The Minister stated that although Professor Gruen had recommended
the repeal of Section 5(9) [rejection of sales at a loss as not being in the
ordinary course of trade], the Government did not consider this appro-
priate. Other countries such as the U.S., Canada and the EC which rely
on anti-dumping as a means to control unfair trade practices had and
used similar proceedings. The Australian Government was not prepared
to provide Australian industry with a lesser safeguard against unfair
competition than that provided by these other countries.
Likewise, the original proposal in the U.S. House of Representa-
tives to abolish the ESP offset was justified by its proponents on the
ground that the EEC did not recognize an offset for indirect selling
expenses incurred in the home market in cases where the exporter sold
through related sales companies in the export market.97
It should be clear from the above that unilateral interpretations
adopted in one jurisdiction may lead to the adoption of similar inter-
pretations in the other jurisdictions without any discussion whatsoever
in the multilateral forum, provided by the GATT and the GATT
Anti-Dumping Code. This amounts to the four jurisdictions effec-
tively short-circuiting the procedures envisaged by GATT.
It is submitted that the only way to call a halt to this development
is the establishment of a much more detailed international framework.
In other words, the GATT Anti-Dumping Code must be both clarified
and expanded, preferably on the basis of the most restrictive interpre-
tation adopted by any jurisdiction. 98 Clarification and expansion
seem desirable especially in the following areas:
Procedure
- The lesser duty rule could be mandatory. While the EEC and
the Australian system could serve as a guide, they leave too
much discretion to the administering authorities. The lesser
duty rule should compare prices of domestic producers with
the prices charged by each foreign producer in the export mar-
ket concerned. Use of target prices (instead of actual prices)
should be minimized and used only as a last resort, i.e., when
the domestic producers concerned have been forced to sell be-
low their cost of production. If target prices are used, the
96. Steele, supra note 1, § 1.3.
97. The 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, supra note 32, did not adopt this
provision.
98. Compare Davey, supra note 61.
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profit margin should be realistic and not provide domestic pro-
ducers with windfall profits.
- Expedited review requirements could be adopted to deal with
new or non-investigated exporters subjected to the residual
duty in the original investigation. Agreement should be
reached on how to set the level of the residual duty (e.g., the
weighted average of the duties imposed on fully cooperating
producers).
- A specific provision dealing with circumvention could be
adopted. This provision should be aimed at striking a balance
between legitimate corporate investment and planning strate-
gies and illegitimate circumvention stratagems. It should apply
the same standards to domestic and foreign producers (national
treatment requirement). One aspect could be a revised "like
product" definition (see below) which would take care of cir-
cumvention through production of slightly differing products
which nevertheless directly compete with the products on
which anti-dumping duties have been imposed. The rules
could also cover third-country assembly or assembly in the
country of importation, provided that such assembly does not
constitute a genuine change of origin of the merchandise con-
cerned. The first best option in this regard would seem estab-
lishment of one uniform rule of origin (e.g., x percent value-
added in the third country or in the country of importation
confers such country's origin on the product concerned and
precludes imposition of anti-dumping or anti-circumvention
duties).
- Anti-dumping duties should be assessed only on transactions
which are actually dumped. The U.S. system of anti-dumping
duty assessment would seem to apply this principle most and
could therefore serve as an example for detailed rules on duty
assessment within the Code. Administering authorities should
make this determination on a transaction-by-transaction basis
on the basis of the facts (and not prospectively on the basis of
historical data).
- The sunset clause (as already adopted by Australia, Canada
and the EEC) could be multilateralized in the form of a GATT
obligation. The length of the sunset clause could be subject to
debate (three years or five years). Transparency of administra-
tive determinations should be increased to the extent possible,
at least for the parties affected by the results of the proceeding.
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Disclosure of confidential information under protective order
could be recommended in the Code.
Dumping
- A five percent rule for determining whether home market sales
have been made in sufficient quantities to be compared to ex-
port sales promotes predictability. The EEC variant providing
that the five percent rule should be applied in relation to EEC
sales seems slightly preferable to the U.S. variant (five percent
of sales to third countries) in that it compares the size of the
relevant markets. The EEC rule could be adopted in the Code.
- Sales below cost and constructed value should be regulated in
the Code in detail. It is submitted that, while it may be very
difficult to turn back the clock and rationalize the concept, any
multilateral regulation is preferable to the "wild west" situa-
tion that prevails at the moment in the four jurisdictions. In-
ternational regulation could focus in the first place on
definition of the four key terms for determining whether sales
below cost were made:
(1) sales in substantial quantities;
(2) over an extended period of time;
(3) at prices which do not permit recovery of all costs;
(4) within a reasonable period of time.
Secondly, it could address the computation of the constructed
value, especially the use of a "reasonable profit margin." The
intention announced by the Australian Government to apply a
zero profit margin in most cases represents an element of ra-
tionality that could be multilateralized in the Code.
- Calculation of the normal value in cases involving non-market
economies could be clarified. Adoption of the factors test in
the U.S. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 as
the preferred method for calculating the normal value for non-
market economies represents an effort towards standardized
treatment of non-market economies that might set an example
for the other jurisdictions and adoption in the Code.
- The rules on adjustments in most jurisdictions display a tilt to-
wards finding dumping. This is especially so in cases where the
foreign exporters sell in their home and export markets
through related sales organizations. A fair comparison would
seem to require deduction of similar expenses on both sides.
The Code should require an "apples-to-apples" approach. The
requirement in many jurisdictions that adjustments can only be
made for expenses which bear a direct relationship to the sales
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under consideration impinges upon commercial reality and is
of questionable value, but can be understood from the adminis-
trator's point of view that it prevents manipulation. As this
requirement assumes special importance in the case of sales
through related parties, the ESP offset in the U.S. seems a rea-
sonable compromise between these conflicting interests and
could be an example for regulation in the GATT and in other
jurisdictions.
In addition, one could envisage a rule that adjustments be
made for all factors affecting price comparability.99 The
GATT Anti-Dumping Code Committee or a specially created
'Technical Committee' could consider and rule on contested
adjustment and calculation issues.1t°
Injury
- The "like product" definition could be expanded to include in-
clusion of products on the basis of a "functional similarity" test
where satisfactory evidence can be supplied by the party re-
questing inclusion that the physically different, but functionally
similar, products compete in the market place.
- Rules on cumulation could be developed with an appropriate
exception (dependent on the market share, the dumping mar-
gin or other factors which clearly distinguish one party from
the other parties involved). In addition, this could be one area
where special consideration be given (e.g., in the form of a
more lenient rule) to the position of new entrant developing
countries. The rules on cumulation could apply to country cu-
mulation and to producer cumulation.
- The mandatory character of the margins analysis could be
made explicit in the Code.
- A meeting competition defense could be incorporated in the
Code. This defense could at least apply where low-priced (sup-
posedly non-dumped) imports in substantial quantities are
present in the market of the complaining industry. (This rule
would seem to be applied already by the EEC as a matter of
administrative practice.) Such a requirement would serve the
dual purpose of preventing manipulation of the territorial
99. Although one could argue that article 2:6 of the GATT Anti-Dumping Code makes it
quite clear that adjustments must be made for all differences affecting price comparability, this
article has not prevented at least one Code Signatory from amending its anti-dumping law so as
to allow adjustments only for a limited list of adjustments. See EEC Regulation 2423/88, supra
note 63, art. 2(9)-(10).
100. Suggestion of Bill Davey, letter to the author (Nov. 28, 1988).
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scope of the investigation by the complaining industry and of
not imposing anti-dumping duties where such duties would not
alleviate the injury of the domestic industry.
Over the past nine years, administrators of the anti-dumping laws
have often hidden behind the technical character of the anti-dumping
law to implement unilateral changes that may have far-reaching conse-
quences for application of the law in concrete cases. It is seldom real-
ized by the public at large that technical changes typically have the
effect of increasing the likelihood of finding dumping and/or injury.
Technical changes often go unchallenged in GATT because the
GATT Code Committee is dominated by the four anti-dumping law
enforcers examined in this article.
This situation is particularly unsatisfactory because anti-dumping
measures have probably become the most important interface mecha-
nism in international trade over the past decade. Trade will only dete-
riorate in view of the fact that more and more countries are starting to
adopt (and use) anti-dumping laws, and typically base these laws and
their application on a combination of the anti-dumping laws of the
four jurisdictions examined here.
The comparative examination of the four jurisdictions undertaken
in this article has shown an acute awareness on the part of anti-dump-
ing administrators of what goes on in other jurisdictions. Thus, pro-
posed changes in one country are often inspired and sometimes
justified by reference to other jurisdictions' law or practice. Too often
GATT-compatibility is assumed.
Detailed multilateral regulation is the first and most important
step to stop or roll back these undesirable developments. In addition
to the issues mentioned above, such regulation could (and probably
should) include a notification and consultation requirement with re-
gard to any proposed future changes, either in law or in practice.
This article suggests that in a globalized interdependent world
economy, today's incremental changes in the anti-dumping law of one
country at the behest of domestic producing interests have a tendency
to spread to other jurisdictions and will have boomerang effects on
those same interests tomorrow. It is, therefore, to the advantage of all
parties to ensure a rational application of anti-dumping laws.
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